A static analysis approach for android permission-based malware detection systems by Juliza, Mohamad Arif et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
A static analysis approach for Android
permission-based malware detection systems
Juliza Mohamad ArifID, Mohd Faizal Ab Razak*, Suryanti Awang, Sharfah Ratibah Tuan
Mat, Nor Syahidatul Nadiah Ismail, Ahmad Firdaus
Faculty of Computing, Universiti Malaysia Pahang, Pekan, Pahang, Malaysia
* faizalrazak@ump.edu.my
Abstract
The evolution of malware is causing mobile devices to crash with increasing frequency.
Therefore, adequate security evaluations that detect Android malware are crucial. Two tech-
niques can be used in this regard: Static analysis, which meticulously examines the full
codes of applications, and dynamic analysis, which monitors malware behaviour. While
both perform security evaluations successfully, there is still room for improvement. The goal
of this research is to examine the effectiveness of static analysis to detect Android malware
by using permission-based features. This study proposes machine learning with different
sets of classifiers was used to evaluate Android malware detection. The feature selection
method in this study was applied to determine which features were most capable of distin-
guishing malware. A total of 5,000 Drebin malware samples and 5,000 Androzoo benign
samples were utilised. The performances of the different sets of classifiers were then com-
pared. The results indicated that with a TPR value of 91.6%, the Random Forest algorithm
achieved the highest level of accuracy in malware detection.
Introduction
The use of mobile devices has rapidly increased throughout the world in recent decades, with
most people now owning mobile device. The convenience of mobile devices enables many
online activities to be performed, for instance, the online streaming of information, social net-
working, video viewing, and online banking. This proliferation of technology has also pro-
vided opportunities for the deployment of malware codes designed to target mobile devices.
Malware is malicious software that attacks the files or programmes that are stored within
mobile devices. Malware can be classified according to the mechanism by which it gains access
to a system: worms, backdoors, trojans, rootkits, spyware, and adware [1]. The McAfee Report
[2] noted that malware such as backdoors, crypto mining, fake applications, and banking tro-
jans increased substantially in the latter half of 2019. Hidden applications and adware were
noted to be the most common form of mobile threats in the Android operating system. The
McAfee report also indicated that the incidence of malware attacks is increasing every year,
with over 30 million mobile malware attacks detected in 2018.
Among the various mobile devices available, Android mobiles are the most commonly tar-
geted by malware. The International Data Corporation (IDC) report on worldwide shipments
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stated that Android mobiles are leading the market, with an increase from 85.1% in 2018 to
87.0% in 2019. In 2020, despite showing a slight decline, Android still led the market at 84.1%
compared to iOS 15.9% and others 0% [3]. However, the popularity of Android mobiles has
produced more security concerns because it raises the prospect of more threats from attackers
who spread the malware, which causes the application to act maliciously. Android devices
have been identified as the most highly targeted systems, with the highest percentage of mal-
ware infections at 47.15%. Malware typically works initially by sending fraudulent messages to
users. When users become interested in these messages, they are charged for fake services.
Other systems tend to suffer less threats: In 2018, the threat rate for Windows/PCs was
35.82%, the Internet of Things (IoT) was 16.17%, and iPhones had a threat rate of 0.85% [4].
Fig 1 shows the percentage of malware attacks on various mobile device in 2018.
A G DATA Cyber Defence analysis showed that a total of 3.2 million new malware were
detected in the third quarter of 2018 in contrast to the third quarter of 2017, in which
2,258,357 malware were detected [2]. The use of Android malware has risen to an extraordi-
nary level. Fig 2 shows the drastic increase in new Android malware samples from 2012 to
2018.
Fig 1. Malware attacks in 2018 by mobile device.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g001
Fig 2. New Android malware samples 2012–2018.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g002
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In the first half of 2019, it was observed that the number of Android malware attacks was
1.85 million and increased to 4.18 million by the end of 2019 [3]. These malware attacks tend
to be surreptitious and creep insidiously into the mobile system. To avoid malware attacks,
mobile users need to take several steps: Avoid installing applications from unknown sources,
avoid downloading applications from unregistered websites, and foster the habit of using anti-
virus software [4]. Antivirus software offers a system for detecting and preventing malware.
However, the weakness of the existing commercial tools is that they only provide protection
against known malware, and unknown or new malware remains undetected [5]. Any mobile
device that is monitored by antivirus software needs frequent signature updates to detect new
malware. Usually, antivirus software prompts the user to install an update to maintain the
security of the device. However, these processes degrade the memory and power consumption
performance of devices [6].
Existing Android security, such as Bouncer, scans and blocks permission requests from var-
ious applications automatically [7]. It is available for download via the Google Play Store.
However, users are at risk of malware attacks if the application is downloaded from a third-
party source. The Android operating system does not govern third-party sources, and users
should exercise caution when agreeing to unreasonable permission requests during the appli-
cation installation process [8]. Android applications that request more permissions than
needed can transform the application’s origin from benign to malicious [9].
Additionally, for Android security, another approach is a permission-based system that acts
as a firewall, filtering out all applications that require permission and preventing Android
applications from accessing personal data [10]. When the application is installed on Android,
the user is notified of the permission request, which should be handled carefully. Even so,
when users grant permissions without fully comprehending the risks, they expose themselves
to unsafe conditions and malicious attacks. An unscrupulous programmer may take advantage
of the user to perform various malicious actions without the user’s consent. Another security
mechanism that protects users from malware attacks is an intrusion detection system (IDS).
Usually, an IDS monitors the network or system to detect intrusions and analyse data traffic
[11]. IDS is widely used in different fields as one of the security mechanisms. It is also used in
the CAN Bus system, where researchers propose CANintelligentIDS to enhance security fea-
tures to prevent malware threats [12, 13] review the IDS on clone node attacks in a static wire-
less sensor network. The IDS protects mobile devices against known or unknown malware; it
also ensures that user data are confidential [10]. Nonetheless, the proliferation of Android mal-
ware demonstrates that there is still room for research into the most effective methods for
countering malware attacks.
Previous research has presented various approaches in mobile malware detection for
Android mobile users [7, 14, 15]. Static and dynamic analyses are two common techniques
used in malware detection [16, 17]. Both techniques are popular as they are perceived to be
successful analysis methods capable of defending Android applications. The static analysis
focuses on detecting Android malware by examining a file without running it on the system.
This technique includes signature and component-based analyses, reverse engineering, and
Dalvik bytecode. Meanwhile, dynamic analysis is capable of detecting malware based on the
behaviour observed in an isolated environment, such as a simulator and virtual machine [15].
Both techniques are then combined to form a hybrid model for improving malware detection
and identification. The hybrid analysis technique performs the static and dynamic analyses
separately; hence, it consumes more resources and takes longer to complete the analysis [18].
An alternative technique is machine learning analysis. This technique automates the analy-
sis of mobile malware detection by recognising the malware pattern. It can achieve a high rate
of malware detection. This technique is a specific field of artificial intelligence that predicts
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future decisions and outputs based on datasets. It refers to the process of characterising mal-
ware behaviour and applying classifiers to evaluate the dataset [19]. In previous studies, the
classifiers most frequently used to assess the necessary features and malware detection include
Naive Bayes, support vector machines, decision trees, Random Forest, K-means, K-nearest
Neighbours AdaBoosting, logistic regression, and J48 [20]. The machine learning and static
analysis techniques require features used to compare the malware and benign applications to
obtain accurate detection. Features used in related studies for malware detection include the
Application Programme Interface (API), a function call, code structure, AndroidManifest.xml,
Intent, and permission [9]. The malware datasets were usually retrieved from Contagiomini-
dump, Genome, Drebin, AMD, and VirusShare, while the benign datasets were usually
retrieved from Google Play, APKpure, APKsapk, Playdrone, and Androzoo.
This study proposes a malware detection system to scrutinise new known malware variants;
it also aims to identify insecure permissions existing in mobile applications. In that respect, the
current study uses static analysis as an approach by focusing on the manifest file (Android-
Manifest.xml), which consists of specific permissions geared towards Android application
development. Such permissions are incapable of change once the development is completed.
In the current study, the features in the manifest file are first organised into a table before the
classification process. An optimisation approach is then utilised to demonstrate the most suit-
able features to detect the malware. This study attempts to evaluate the efficacy of the static
analysis technique by using the machine learning approach and using the application’s permis-
sion noted in the manifest file.
The following are the paper’s primary contributions:
i. To identify the optimal features via optimisation techniques in order to improve Android
malware detection accuracy.
ii. To conduct an experiment using Android permission features by implementing static anal-
ysis in the Android malware detection.
iii. To assess the machine learning classifier’s effectiveness at detecting Android malware.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the state of the art of mal-
ware detection. It introduces the previous research conducted in the field of Android mobile
malware detection. Section 3 discusses the methodology of the study. It describes the general
process of implementing an Android malware detection system, such as the general architec-
ture, the data collection phase, and the machine learning phase. Section 4 presents the evalua-
tion and results of the implementation. It focuses on the evaluation of the experiment and the
efficacy of the proposed method. Section 5 provides the conclusion. It explains the achieve-
ment of the objectives and the contributions of this research to malware detection. It also dis-
cusses the findings and limitations of this study.
Related work
In this era of globalisation, people commonly use their mobile devices in a variety of ways, for
example, as a network connection to interact with the world, for online shopping, for online
banking transactions, or even for cloud storage of files and documents. Nonetheless, some
unscrupulous programmers take advantage of these situations to create and install mobile mal-
ware. Mobile malware is capable of stealing user information and exploiting it [21]. There are
many ways in which malware can corrupt the system or programmes of mobile devices, such
as bypassing the access control of the devices and deleting or encrypting sensitive data [15],
consuming excessive battery [20], and even turning the device into a botnet zombie [1].
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Malware is defined by its malicious contents and behaviour that violates the requirements of
the system. This includes observing user system activities without authorisation. Malware
spreads by self-propagating and through social engineering [20]. Self-propagating strategies
automatically install malware into a mobile device, for instance, worms and viruses [22]. Social
engineering takes advantage of users who have no security knowledge. It tricks such users into
manually installing malware applications onto their mobile devices [20]. Cabir was the first
malware detected in 2004 that could use networking technologies to spread and generate infec-
tions [10]. The Zeus botnet, which was reported in 2007, is one of the common malware that
can control many computers and steal data in banking organisation [23]. The DroidDream is
the mobile malware detected in 2011, and it can gain root access, steal information and add
malware to the mobile phone [24, 25]. FakePlayer is Russia’s first Trojan Android malware dis-
covered in 2010. It works as a media player application and sends the SMS to the premium
number without user consent [10].
The Android system is an open system, which can become an easy target for malware
attackers who can contaminate the operating system [26]. In May 2019, Android malware
tracking recorded more than 10.5 million programmes [27]. The growth of Android mobile
users has certainly augmented the spread of Android malware. As can be observed in the
Nokia Threat Intelligence Report [28], of the 20 most frequently detected Android malware in
2018, six were new malware. Android.Adware.AdultSwine was the most frequently detected
Android malware at 17.29%. AdultSwine uses inappropriate advertisements to deceive mobile
users into installing and registering fake security applications with an unknown cost. Once
this installation has been performed, the malware is very difficult to remove [4]. In 2017,
Android.Adware.Uapush.A was listed as the leading Android malware. Android.Adware.
Uapush is an Android adware Trojan that has had a moderate impact on mobile users. The
Uapush adware sends the International Mobile Subscriber Identity, the International Mobile
Equipment Identity, contact information, bookmarks, and call history to a Command and
Control Server in China [29]. The adware then sends a message with obscure programming to
advertise and promote a business without user consent [30]. Even though the Uapush adware
was the highest ranking in terms of attacks in 2017, its impact on mobile users has not been
too severe.
Malware intrusion detection systems
Although there are security mechanisms, such as firewalls, antivirus software, and IDSs, to
secure mobile devices, there is still a need to develop a novel approach towards detecting mal-
ware. Commercial antivirus mechanisms can effectively detect known malware, but they are
incapable of detecting unknown malware. Therefore, malware detection techniques with high
levels of accuracy and speed are important to ensure the effectiveness of such malware applica-
tions. The IDSs were developed to protect devices from attackers. If an intrusion is detected,
then it is logged, and an alert is generated. The malware IDSs are divided into three classifica-
tions, as illustrated in Fig 3.
Analysis technique. The two most common techniques used in this field are static and
dynamic analysis techniques. The static analysis technique analyses the programmes without
executing them. The static examination is possible by using the program analyser, debugger,
and disassembler [31]. The features commonly used in the static analysis are permission, intent
filters, Java code, network address, strings, and hardware components [32]. Android applica-
tions use permissions to protect the mobiles from malware. The application requests permis-
sion to access the mobile device during the installation process [33]. Meanwhile, Android
applications use API calls to communicate with the devices. Dishonest programmers normally
PLOS ONE Android permission-based malware detection system
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change the sequence and then rename the API calls to evade the detection system. This is
known as code obfuscation. It is then saved as a Dalvik format. Fraudulent programmers are
able to modify the code-base and inject malicious code into Android applications. All the static
features are accessible in the AndroidManifest.xml file or Java code file. Table 1 shows the
related work in static analysis.
In contrast, the dynamic analysis runs the application in a safe environment while observ-
ing the malware behaviour [7]. It is capable of detecting malware when the obfuscation tech-
nique is applied. The features most commonly selected for detecting malware in the dynamic
analysis were memory and registry usage, instruction traces, network traffic, and API call
traces [38]. More than 1,000 datasets were used in these studies. The accuracy rate of the detec-
tion was more than 90%. Various tools used in the dynamic analysis include CrowDroid,
TaintDroid, ParanoidAndroid, Aurasium, Appfence, and DriodScope [17]. The hybrid analy-
sis combines both static and dynamic analyses. In the hybrid analysis, user behaviours and per-
mission intent were the most common features selected for detecting malware. More than
Fig 3. Taxonomy of malware intrusion detection systems.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g003
Table 1. Related work in static analysis.
References Year Tools Objective Limitation
[32] 2009 Kirin To provide lightweight certification for applications that incorporate
security rules to mitigate malware during the installation process.
Specific rules may be deemed unenforceable for any
number of reasons.
[33] 2011 Stowaway To detects overprivileged in compiled Android applications. The tool is unable to handle multiple reflective calls.
[34] 2012 RiskRanker To analyse a specific application dangerous behaviour using risk analysis Malware is easy to escape in the first step, as
RiskRanker uses the heuristic only in the second step
[35] 2013 AndroSimilar To generates a signature by extracting statistically improbable features to
detect malicious Android apps.
Consist significantly less malware signature
[36] 2014 FLOWDROID To provides static taint analysis for Android applications Resolves reflective calls only with string constants and
unaware of multi-threading
[37] 2020 AdDroid To analyse and detect malware in Android applications using a variety of
artefact combinations referred to as Rules.
The small and imbalanced dataset is used in the
experiment
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.t001
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4,000 datasets extracted from MARVIN, Drebin, Genome and Virushare were used in these
studies. The accuracy rate of the detection was more than 90% [39].
Detection approach. There are two common approaches used for detecting malware: Sig-
nature-based and anomaly-based [40]. The signature-based approach relies on recognising the
signature of the malware behaviour. In contrast, the anomaly-based approach uses its knowl-
edge to compare the normal and abnormal behaviours of a system [1]. Programmes that devi-
ate from the specifications are assessed as anomalous and, usually, as malware. The
combination of these two approaches is known as a hybrid approach.
Deployment approach. The deployment approach in the IDS can be divided into three
categories: A host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS), a network-based intrusion detec-
tion system (NIDS), and a hybrid-based IDS. The HIDS assembles resources from end devices
(host) and servers. It also monitors and analyses intrusive traffic in the system resources and
emphasises the CPU consumption, the file system, memory, and device [30]. In the event of a
change occurring to the host system, the IDS sensor then checks the abnormal activity in the
log entry by using a signature. If the signatures correspond, the sensor will notify the manage-
ment console [41]. If any anomalous activities have occurred, the administrator will receive a
warning. Another development of the HIDS is the application-based IDS. It monitors net-
works’ traffic, such as inspection files, void file executions, and abnormal traffic.
A NIDS is used to sniff network traffic for examination. This is accomplished by using a
deep packet analyser [1]. A NIDS is vital in today’s computer network infrastructure to moni-
tor and identify unwanted and malicious network traffic [22]. The NIDS uses anomaly- and
signature-based detection approaches. The sensor in the NIDS analyses all the packet headers
to detect malicious attacks; HIDS cannot detect this type of attack [42]. Analysis of the header
packet can detect the IP-based denial of service attacks in network traffic. The NIDS sensor is
capable of detecting attacks based on the packet header in real-time. Many tools are used in
the NIDS. Among them are Honeypot, Snort, Solarwinds, Sagan, and Splunk. The combina-
tion of the HIDS and NIDS approaches is known as a hybrid-based IDS.
Android malware features. Android malware features include static, dynamic, hybrid,
and application metadata features. Fig 4 shows the taxonomy of Android malware features.
The static features are available in the AndroidManifest.xml or Java code file. The common
static features used are permission, Java code, intent filters, network address, strings, and hard-
ware components. In comparison, dynamic features refer to the application behaviours that
communicate between the operating systems or networks. A previous study used network
Fig 4. Taxonomy of Android malware features.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g004
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traffic, system calls, and API calls as dynamic features to detect malware. Hybrid features are
those derived from a combination of static and dynamic features. They are used in the detec-
tion system as an additional measure to increase accuracy. The application metadata features
refer to the information that appears before a download installs the application. They include
the application description, rating, requested permission, and developer information. The
selection of features is a crucial part of the classification process. Some of the features used in
previous studies [43–45] were permission-based features [40] that used the API call sequence
features and [46] intent.
The current study applied permission-based features (static features) to detect Android
mobile malware. Permission codes involve applications making frequent permission requests,
such as for the internet, to send_sms, access_network_state, receive_sms, and write_external_-
storage. In this regard, mobile users should be aware of the application permission request to
be better prepared for protecting their mobile devices. Neglecting an application’s permission
request can cause harm to mobile devices. Android permissions are the permissions that an
application requests the mobile user to grant during the installation. It is the first security step
in Android mobile devices. The permission is the first obstacle a user encounters with an
unscrupulous programmer before an attack. Android permissions can be categorised into four
levels of protection known as a normal, dangerous, signature, and signatureORsystem [19, 47].
Each protection level involves a base permission type and zero or more flags. Normal permis-
sions are the default permissions of lower risk, which are automatically granted during installa-
tion without the user’s permission. Dangerous permissions are higher risk permissions that
allow a malware application’s request to access the user’s data or control devices, exposing
mobile users to threats. Signature permissions automatically grant the permission of the appli-
cation request when a signed certificate matches the application that declared the permission.
SignatureOrSystem grants the applications in a dedicated folder on the Android system image
or that are signed with the same certificate as the application that declared the permission.
Multiple vendors use SignatureOrSystem level to share specific features when developing
applications. Therefore, the awareness of mobile users concerning the dangers of malware
must be increased. Otherwise, more damage and losses to their devices will occur [1]. Table 2
shows the protection level of Android permissions, descriptions, and examples of the permis-
sions [47].
Methodology
This section discusses the process of the malware detection system and the implementation of
machine learning. There are four phases in the Android mobile malware detection system.
They include data collection, data analysis, the database, and machine learning. The fourth
phase contains the evaluation phase, which uses the machine learning approach to classify
Table 2. Android permission protection level.
Protection level Description Example of permission features
Normal Low risk to users or apps. Automatically allow the




Dangerous High risk to the user. Apps need to prompt the user
and wait until user approval
ACCESS_MEDIA_LOCATION, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,
ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION, ACCEPT_HANDOVER.
Signature The system grants the apps when the same certificate
signs the apps
BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE, BIND_AUTOFILL_SERVICE.
SignatureOrSystem Grants the applications in a dedicated folder that
signed with the same certificate.
BATTERY_STATS BIND_CALL_REDIRECTION_SERVICE
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.t002
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each of the malware families and analyse the application permissions that can detect benign or
malware applications. Fig 5 shows the architecture of the malware detection system.
Detailed in the figure is the malware detection system process. It involves the four phases
mentioned above. The data collection begins by collecting all the permissions in the malware
and benign applications. The data are then processed in the analysis, which decompiles the
apk file. This is then extracted to the data cleansing process, which filters the permissions. For
data labelling, all the permissions that have been assembled are saved in an attribute relation
file format (x.arff). They are then stored in a database in a readable format. All the feature attri-
butes used in the feature optimisation process are saved in a.arff file. A three feature optimisa-
tion technique aims mainly at analysing patterns.
The data collection and the optimisation process of the features are crucial for detecting
malware. During the cleansing process, malware and benign behaviours are detected. Follow-
ing this, a notification is then sent to the database. During this phase, data labelling relies on
the permission package name to ensure that the same features and applications are detached
from the database. The final process is machine learning, whereby feature optimisation exe-
cutes the labelled data with 10-fold cross-validation and evaluation. This is achieved by using a
training classifier to detect the malware. The current experiment utilises the detection perfor-
mance, such as the level of accuracy and false positive rate, to detect malware.
Data collection process
In the data collection phase, the malware and benign datasets were extracted and then com-
piled in.csv file format. The random samples were retrieved from the Androzoo and Drebin
datasets. The Androzoo dataset consists of more than three million applications and is scruti-
nised by ten types of antivirus products for malware detection. This dataset has the potential to
contribute to new research topics within the Android application and can engage in reproduc-
ible experiments. The dataset is accessible at https://Androzoo.uni.lu [48]. The Drebin dataset
contributes to the public academic dataset of Android malware that was launched in 2014. The
dataset was introduced in the article ‘DREBIN: Effective and Explainable Detection of Android
Malware in Your Pocket’. The research community mostly uses the Drebin dataset as a mal-
ware dataset to evaluate the effectiveness of a detection system and compare an algorithm’s
performance. The Drebin dataset is available at the website Http://user.cs.uni-goettingen.de/
˜darp/drebin [49]. A set of 10,000 samples from the dataset that is confined to the applications
is presented in Table 3.
The benign applications were downloaded from Androzoo, which belongs to the Google
Play store. The malware applications were downloaded from the Drebin project. The current
study collected 274 lists of permissions (known as features). The datasets were then labelled as
benign or malware in the last column. The 10,000 samples were indicated by hash numbers to
Fig 5. Malware detection system.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g005
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avoid duplications. The datasets were then saved in a binary format (.CSV) and subsequently
transformed to the attribute relation file format. Fig 6 shows the data collection process.
The AndroidManifest.xml file was used to obtain essential information such as the permis-
sions and activities of the application. Before the dataset were saved in the database as a x.arff
file, all extracted permissions were labelled as benign and malware. These features served as
attribute values and were termed the ‘feature set’. The values represent the binary value con-
cerning whether permission was requested or not by the application. The values were stated as
‘1’, which represented permission requested by a specific application, while ‘0’ represented per-
mission not requested by the specific application. Table 4 shows the 10 Android applications
most frequently granted permissions for access to the system by malware or benign applica-
tions analysed from the database.
Table 4 shows that the malware and benign applications had six comparable permissions
involving INTERNET, READ_PHONE_STATE, WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE,
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, and WAKE_LOCK. The INTER-
NET permissions comprised the highest percentage, with malware at 99% and benign at 81%.
Seven applications were dangerous permissions involving READ_PHONE_STATE, WRI-
TE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS, ACCESS_FINE_-
LOCATION and GET_ACCOUNTS. Table 5 shows the description of the ten permission
features most requested by malware applications. Fig 7 shows the comparative graph for the
six permissions requested by the malware and benign applications.
The graph indicates that INTERNET applications made the highest number of requests.
Although the INTERNET application request was the highest, it did not have a critical impact
on mobile users because the protection level is normal. The READ_PHONE_STATE permis-
sion had the highest percentage of requests among the dangerous applications requested by
malware applications. This permission allows an unscrupulous programmer with privileged
read-only access to phone state information, such as network information, phone numbers,
call history, and the phone account [49]. As a result, the mobile user needs to pay more atten-
tion to those dangerous permissions because they can cause harm to the mobile device. Fur-
ther, optimisation features can also be used to obtain the best features of the permissions.
Table 3. Dataset summary.





Fig 6. Data collection process.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g006
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Machine learning process
Machine learning, known as artificial intelligence, is used to solve complex problems and
reduce decision-making times for human beings. They are used in several fields, such as medi-
cine, space exploration, engineering, lab work, aviation and more [50]. In this study, the
machine learning approach was developed to heighten the effectiveness of malware detection.
It automates the analytical model that characterises the malware behaviour process. Typically,
the machine learning process involves three phases: File representation, feature selection, and
classification [35]. Machine learning takes two routes: Supervised and unsupervised tech-
niques [37]. Supervised learning uses label datasets that are classified as either malware or
benign. The training dataset is evaluated by using application features with a class label. In
contrast, unsupervised learning uses unlabeled datasets which are assigned to a different group
known as a cluster. The large datasets are then grouped into smaller datasets with similarities.
This study uses supervised and randomised datasets to evaluate permission features on detect-
ing Android malware.
Feature optimisation is used to optimise permission features. The implementation of the
optimisation approach can reduce training and testing time, reduce overfitting, and simplify
malware detection. This approach is ideal for data processing and increasing the accuracy of
the experiments. It is an effective malware detection system. The process begins with cleaning
the dataset, which removes any irrelevant and redundant features. The next stage is to acquire
Table 4. 10 most frequent permission requests in malware and benign applications.
Malware Application Benign Application
Permission Protection Level Frequency (%) Permission Protection Level Frequency (%)
INTERNET Normal 99 INTERNET Normal 81
READ_PHONE_STATE Dangerous 94 ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Normal 74
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Dangerous 72 WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Dangerous 55
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Normal 71 WAKE_LOCK Normal 32
SEND_SMS Dangerous 53 READ_PHONE_STATE Dangerous 31
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Normal 52 VIBRATE Normal 25
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Normal 48 ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Normal 24
WAKE_LOCK Normal 42 ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Dangerous 22
RECEIVE_SMS Dangerous 40 GET_ACCOUNTS Dangerous 22
READ_SMS Dangerous 40 RECEIVE Signature 21
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.t004
Table 5. Description of the ten highest permission requests by malware applications.
Android Application Description
INTERNET Enable apps to open the network socket.
READ_PHONE_STATE Enable access to phone state with read-only privilege (phone number, ongoing calls status, cellular network information, and
PhoneAccounts).
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Enable external storage written by any apps
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Enables apps to access network information
SEND_SMS Enables apps to send Short Message Service (SMS).
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED Enables apps to accept the broadcast Intent.ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED after the complete boot process.
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Enables apps to grant information in Wi-Fi networks.
WAKE_LOCK Enables use of PowerManager WakeLocks to manage sleeping processor or dimming screen.
RECEIVE_SMS Enables apps to receive SMS messages.
READ_SMS Enables apps to read SMS messages.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.t005
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data randomisation. For this, the Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) was
used to evaluate the Android application. Weka is one of the machine learning software used
to solve complex issues. It provides a graphical interface to display the results and different
algorithms to predict and model the data [51]. applied WEKA to evaluate and improve the
quality of Android software [52]. used WEKA to process the failure log data set for industrial
machine components and prioritise components that are more likely to fail. In addition,
WEKA provides optimum results for feature optimisation as well as for dataset filtering pro-
cesses [53]. The filtering process was used to predict datasets at random. This process allows
any possible biases to be removed during the experiment [19]. applied WEKA for features
optimisation and malware detection. In this study, to select the best features, the optimisation
technique was used. Three optimisation techniques were selected to distinguish the malware
detection results. They included particle swarm optimisation (PSO), information gain, and
evolutionary computation. The performance between the different classifiers was measured to
determine the effectiveness of the Android malware detection.
PSO is an approach that seeks to solve problems in optimising decision-making. It was cre-
ated by Kennedy and Eberhart in 1995 [54]. PSO is a swarm-intelligence-based, non-deter-
ministic optimisation approach. It was created from the desire to simulate animal behaviour
(bird swarms) [55]. This approach and the location of the particles (sample of the experiment)
is alternated in the research area to achieve optimal results and resolve computational restric-
tions. The optimisation algorithm in PSO is capable of enhancing machine learning
approaches for detecting malware [19]. The PSO applied in [19] was intended to increase mal-
ware detection performance. This study [56] used the PSO to optimise the random generation
of candidate detectors and parameters because PSO enhances the ANFIS performance [55] by
modifying membership functions and reducing errors. The PSO concept includes each time
step, changing the velocity of a particle represented by pbest (the value of fitness) and gbest
(global version). Information gain then evaluates the value of an attribute by assessing the
information gain concerning the class. Evolutionary computation explores the attribute space
via an evolutionary algorithm. To identify efficacy in the Android malware detection areas, the
performances of five classifiers were compared. This study implemented a 10,000 sample data-
set which included 5,000 malware and 5,000 benign samples.
Experiment and results
This section describes the Android malware detection system and the evaluation process that
used WEKA as the machine learning tool. This study evaluated the effectiveness of an Android
malware detection system that applied static analysis techniques with machine learning
Fig 7. Comparison of total permission requests by malware and benign applications.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g007
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approaches. A standard metric was used for detecting malware. A high true positive (TP) value
was required to depict an accurate result. A TP occurs when the system correctly recognises
malware as malicious. A false negative (FN) occurs when it incorrectly identifies malware as
benign. A true negative (TN) occurs if the system recognises the benign programme as benign
correctly, whereas false positive (FP) occurs when a benign programme is incorrectly identi-
fied as malicious. This study used the Androzoo dataset for benign applications and the Drebin
dataset for malware applications. The total number of datasets involved in this experiment
amounted to 10,000 samples.
The evaluation process started with the collection of the malware and benign samples.
These were then combined into one database for training and testing the sets. The datasets
were then labelled as malware or benign. The datasets were first pre-preprocessed and then fil-
tered as unsupervised and randomised. The PSO, information gain, and evolutionary compu-
tation were then utilised for optimisation to obtain the best features. Tables 6–8 shows the
twenty features selected from PSO, information gain and evolutionary computation
approaches. Following this, the dataset that was evaluated by the five classifiers with 10-fold
cross-validation was used to restrict the problem of overfitting. It is important to ensure that
the dataset can be read and the technique can be facilitated in an unknown dataset [15].
Table 9 shows the result of the five machine learning classifiers used for detecting malware.
They were Random Forest, MLP, kNN, J48, and Adaboost.
Table 9 shows the detection performance of five Android malware detection classifiers. The
performance of each classifier is measured by five performance metrics such as TPR, FPR, pre-
cision, recall, f-measure and accuracy. The table indicates that PSO performs better than infor-
mation gain, evolutionary computation. Furthermore, Random Forests and kNN on PSO
perform well with 91.6% TPR. For each classifier, the average TPR is above 90% except for
Adabosst, which is 89%. The results showed that permission-based features and machine
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learning classifiers are an effective way to detect Android malware. Features optimisation also
helped to identify the best possible features and enhance accuracy in Android malware
detection.
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Receiver operating characteristic curve
A receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) is a graphical plot. It is used to represent the
evaluation of performance detection in machine learning approaches. The ROC curve mea-
sures the effectiveness of the classifier prediction. The more closely the apex curve approaches
the upper left corner, the more accurate the prediction. The left corner indicates that the classi-
fier correctly detected the malware; it showed high accuracy with minimal false alarms. Fig 8
indicates that the five classifiers produced good performances based on the PSO results
because the ROC curve was close to the top left corner.
Area under a curve
The area under a curve (AUC) is used to measure the performance of the classifier with the fol-
lowing threshold values: 1 indicates perfect prediction, 0.9 excellent prediction, 0.8 good pre-
diction, 0.7 mediocre prediction, and 0.6 poor prediction. Table 10 shows the evaluation of
AUC, in which all the classifiers obtained excellent prediction. This demonstrates that the fea-
tures chosen are capable of detecting Android malware. Random Forest attained the highest
Table 9. Results of detection performance.
Optimisation Technique Machine Learning Classifier Performance Metric
Accuracy
(%)
TPR (%) Precision (%) Recall (%) F-Measures (%) FPR
PSO Random Forest 91.59 91.6 91.6 91.6 91.6 0.084
MLP 91.24 91.2 91.3 91.2 91.2 0.088
kNN 91.56 91.6 91.6 91.6 91.6 0.084
J48 91.07 91.1 91.1 91.1 91.1 0.089
Adaboost 89.03 89.0 89.2 89.0 89.0 0.110
Information Gain Random Forest 90.54 90.5 90.5 90.5 90.5 0.095
MLP 90.56 90.6 90.6 90.6 90.6 0.094
kNN 90.6 90.6 90.6 90.6 90.6 0.094
J48 90.35 90.4 90.4 90.4 90.3 0.097
Adaboost 89.53 89.5 89.6 89.5 89.5 0.105
Evolutionary Computation Random Forest 90.5 90.5 90.6 90.5 90.5 0.095
MLP 90.49 90.5 90.5 90.5 90.5 0.095
kNN 90.51 90.5 90.6 90.5 90.5 0.095
J48 90.18 90.1 90.3 90.2 90.2 0.098
Adaboost 88.55 88.6 88.7 88.6 88.5 0.115
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.t009
Fig 8. Receiver operating characteristic curve.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g008
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accuracy rate and was the most effective classifier for predicting malware. Random Forest is an
ensemble classifier in machine learning using decision trees. A different subset of training data
are constructed with an auxiliary to train each tree. This classifier is also known as the divide
and conquer algorithm. It has been proven to produce highly accurate results [53] and [6] is
effective in detecting malware.
Box plot analysis
The box plot analysis is applied to validate the experiment assessment based on the PSO per-
formance metric result. All test results have been saved in a.arff file, and then converted to a.
csv file. The result of precision, recall and f-measure were then produced in box plot graphs for
experimental evaluation and are shown in Figs 9–11. The top whiskers demonstrate that the
five classifiers achieved high precision rates of greater than 0.9%. Recall and f-measure rates
also achieved high result with significantly higher than 0.9%, except for the Adaboost, the per-
formance value is greater than 0.8%. In addition, five classifiers also show the value is going
from 0.0 to 1.0. As a result, it was indicated that the performance demonstrates high precision
with a high recall rate, proving that it is effective at accurately detecting malware.
Discussion
This section discusses the results of static analysis for Android malware detection. To enhance
the accuracy of Android malware detection, three optimisation techniques are used for fea-
tures selection–PSO, information gain and evolutionary computation. Twenty features of the
Android application are selected and has been evaluated by a machine learning approach with
five classifiers. PSO with Random Forest classifier present the best result accuracy compare to
others. Despite this, the others classifiers still consistently produces high-accuracy results in
excess of 88%. The comparative analysis of the study’s findings with previous research served
to emphasise the study’s relevance. Table 11 show the comparative study with related work.
[51] has shown 91.95% accuracy in malware detection. However, only 7400 datasets were
used compared with 10,000 data sets in this study [9]. applied information gain as features
optimisation, and Random Forest achieved the highest F-measure result, 94.3% in malware
detection. However, there is only an F-measure result is present. [58] applied information gain
as features optimisation and indicates Random Forest is the highest accuracy result, 94.73% in
malware detection. However, it involved a small dataset which is 3128, and only accuracy
results are present. In contrast, this study examines three optimisation techniques for the selec-
tion of features, namely PSO, information gain and evolutionary computation. It also displays
complete metric evaluation results and achieves high accuracy and low FPR. The FPR value is
important in determining the value of malware that has been incorrectly predicted [35]. The
results of the performance assessment show that this approach can detect well-known malware
for Android. This study also used the real Android data collection and applied different classi-
fiers to evaluate Android malware detection.
Table 10. Evaluation of AUC.
Classifier AUC Level
Random Forest 0.9974 Excellent Prediction
kNN 0.9945 Excellent Prediction
J48 0.9839 Excellent Prediction
MLP 0.9672 Excellent Prediction
Adaboost 0.9605 Excellent Prediction
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.t010
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Fig 9. Precision.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g009
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Fig 10. Recall.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g010
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Fig 11. F-Measure.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.g011
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Conclusion
As previously stated, the current study utilised a machine learning approach which was com-
prised of five classifiers to detect Android mobile malware. The most effective classifiers were
selected, which consisted of Random Forest, MLP, kNN, J48, and Adaboost. Permission fea-
tures have been utilised to evaluate the efficiency of classifiers based on TPR results. Drebin’s
malware dataset includes 5,000 samples, while Androzoo’s benign dataset included 5,000
benign samples. They were then utilised to evaluate the static analysis technique. When apply-
ing the machine learning approach, the three stages of feature optimisation, training classifiers,
and the evaluation of the machine learning classifiers were observed. The experiment results
showed that Random Forest achieved the highest TPR of 91.6% for feature optimisation. This
result proved that the machine learning classifier was able to detect Android malware.
As is the case in all research, the current study was also constrained by some limitations.
First, it focused only on permission-based features. Future studies may want to extend the
model by identifying more malware behaviours along with the extraction of other features,
such as API calls and code analysis. These could serve as the basic input for the model. A risk
assessment system could also be considered in future studies to optimise malware detection.
Through the risk assessment, the risk of each permission request would then be prioritised and
zoned. The prioritising and zoning practice would raise mobile users’ awareness of potential
malware damage. It is hoped that the research community will consider conducting further
investigations into the problem of Android malware. The input of the community would serve
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Table 11. Comparative study with related work.
Reference Objective Features Algorithm Result
This
study
To propose a mobile malware detection system based on
static analysis
Permission-based Particle Swarm Optimisation with 5 machine
learning classifiers (RF, MLP, J48, kNN,
Adaboost)
Accuracy = 91.6%
[57] To identify those spare permissions requested and use this
information in the security and privacy approach, which use
static and code analysis
Permission-based,
code analysis
Bayesnet, Naive Bayes, logistic regression, MLP,
Ibk, K star, Decision Table, OneR, J48, RF,
Random Tree.
Accuracy = 91.95%
[9] Providing an efficient classification model to detect mobile
malware or mobile malware risk factors
Permission and
API calls
RF, J48, Random Tree, kNN and Naive Bayes. F-
measure = 94.3%




SVM, Naïve Bayes and Random Forest Accuracy = 94.73%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257968.t011
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